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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the problem of distilling a secret key in a Gaus-
sian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) scenario with two le-
gitimate nodes and an eavesdropper. Focusing on the realistic case
without perfect knowledge of the eavesdropper channel, and follow-
ing a conservative practical approach based on the maximization of
the worst case secret key capacity (SKC), the problem of designing
the optimal transmit covariance matrix is reformulated as a convex
optimization problem. In the limiting case in which the eavesdropper
channel can not be estimated, or when the estimate is highly unre-
liable, the optimal covariance matrix can be obtained by means of
waterfilling or matched filtering like algorithms. Additionally, we il-
lustrate the benefits of allowing time sharing between transmissions
of the two legitimate nodes, and provide an efficient algorithm for
obtaining the optimal transmit covariance matrices and time-sharing
factor.
Index Terms— Secret Key Capacity (SKC), Induced Source
Model, Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO), Robust Design,
Time-Sharing, S-Procedure.
1. INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, physical layer security [1, 2] has received
increasing interest of the information theory, signal processing, and
communications communities. Unlike traditional cryptographic ap-
proaches, this new paradigm does not rely on the assumption of at-
tackers with limited computing power, thus providing fundamental
limits for security.
While information theoretic security is a very active research
area, many important results are already available, both for the se-
cure transmission of information (secrecy capacity) [3–7], as well as
for generation of secret keys (secret key capacity) [1, 8]. However,
from a signal processing perspective, most of the literature is fo-
cused on secrecy capacity issues [9–11], as well as other interesting
topics such as authentication [12–15] or discriminatory channel esti-
mation [16,17]. Thus, it is rather surprising that the signal processing
approaches to secret key capacity (SKC) are really scarce [12,18]. In
particular, [18] considers a MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel, com-
plemented by a public authenticated channel, and the transmit co-
variance matrix is optimized in order to maximize the SKC, with
some interesting insights in the case of low and high signal to noise
ratios (SNRs).
In this paper we extend the results in [18] in two different ways.
First of all, we consider the realistic case in which the eavesdropper
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Fig. 1. Considered scenario. Alice and Bob use the wireless medium
for inducing common randomness. The secret key is distilled by
interchanging messages over the public authenticated channel.
channel is not perfectly known, and following a conservative worst-
case approach, we show that the robust problem can be reformulated
as a convex optimization problem. Secondly, we consider the case in
which both legitimate nodes are allowed to transmit, and provide an
algorithm for obtaining the fraction of time and power to be allocated
to each node in order to maximize the SKC. Finally, we also consider
the practical cases in which the eavesdropper channel estimate is
very inaccurate or not even available. In these cases, the optimal
power allocation is given by a waterfilling or matched filtering like
solution, which constitutes an important difference with the results
obtained in [18] for low and high SNRs.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND GENERAL
SOLUTION
We adopt the system model in [18] (see Figure 1), where a couple
of legitimate multiantenna nodes (Alice and Bob) try to distill a se-
cret key unknown to a multiantenna eavesdropper (Eve). The three
nodes have access to both the wireless medium, and an ideal (infinite
rate, error free) authenticated public channel, which is used by Alice
and Bob as a feedback channel for distilling a secret key. In particu-
lar, the secret-key agreement protocol consists of the following two
phases:
1. Alice transmits over the wireless medium, which results in a
set of observations at Bob (the received signals Y ) and Alice
(the transmitted signals X), as well as in a set of signals Z
received by Eve.
2. Based on their observations, Alice and Bob interchange a set
of messages FA, FB over the public channel, with the aim
of distilling a secret key K unknown to Eve. Formally, the
final goal consists in having a key satisfying the following
requirements [1, 18]:
• Reliability: Alice and Bob obtain the same key, i.e.,
if we denote KA and KB as the keys distilled by Alice
and Bob, we need to ensure limn→∞ P (KA 6= KB) =
0, where P (·) denotes probability, and n represents the
number of uses of the wireless medium.
• Strong Secrecy: We need to ensure that Eve can not
extract any useful information about the secret key,
from the observed signals and messages. Formally,
limn→∞ I(K;Z,FA, FB) = 0, where I(·; ·) denotes
mutual information.
• Uniformity: The entropy of the secret key has to be
maximized, i.e., limn→∞ |H(K) − nR| = 0, where
H(·) denotes entropy, n is the number of channel uses,
and R is the secret key generation rate.
We must note here that we are focusing on a simplified model
in which the over the air signals do not depend on the messages
transmitted through the public channel. This more general setup,
which is beyond the scope of this paper, is known as the channel
model for secret key agreement [1], and it represents an interesting
information theoretic open problem. Thus, the problem considered
in this paper can be referred to as an induced source model for secret
key agreement, and the obtained results can be seen as a lower bound
for the achievable rate in the channel model.
Let us start by writing the signals received by Bob and Eve as
y = HABx + nB , z = HAEx + nE , (1)
where HAB ∈ CNB×NA and HAE ∈ CNE×NA represent, re-
spectively, the MIMO channel matrices from Alice to Bob and Eve.
Analogously, nB and nE are two independent circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian noise vectors with zero mean and identity covari-
ance matrices E[nBnHB ] = INB , E[nEn
H
E ] = INE . Obviously,
NA, NB and NE represent the number of antennas at Alice, Bob
and Eve.
Under the previous assumptions,1 and for a fixed covariance ma-
trix KA = E[xxH ], the secret key capacity is achieved with Gaus-
sian signaling and is given by [1, 18]
RAB = C(RAB + RAE ,KA)− C(RAE ,KA), (2)
where RAB = HHABHAB , RAE = H
H
AEHAE , and C(R,K) =
log |I + RK| is the conventional Shannon’s capacity. Analogously
to [18], here we consider the problem of designing the covariance
matrix KA for maximizing the secret key capacity. However, we do
not assume perfect knowledge of the eavesdropper channel, which
we model as
HAE = ĤAE + ∆HAE , (3)
where ĤAE represents the estimated channel, and ∆HAE is an
error term which is assumed to be bounded as ‖∆HAE‖
2
WA
=
tr(∆HAEWA∆
H
HAE
) ≤ 1, with WA a fixed positive semidefinite
(WA  0) weighting matrix. Although the information theoretical
1We omit here the problem of designing practical codes for secret key
agreement, which is beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader
can find details in [1, 8].
analysis of the scenario without CSI has received increasing atten-
tion, there are still several open questions that do not seem easy to
answer, and the practical application of approaches based on the
compound wiretap channel [19] are not completely clear. Here,
we follow a practical conservative approach based on ensuring that
the eavesdropper channel is degraded with respect to the estimated
worst case “channel”. In particular, we consider the optimization
problem
maximize
KA,RAE
C(RAB + RAE ,KA)− C(RAE ,KA)
subject to RAE  HHAEHAE ∀‖HAE − ĤAE‖WA ≤ 1,
KA ∈ SKA ,
(4)
where the convex set SKA represents the set of feasible transmit
covariance matrices. In particular, we will focus on the case of a to-
tal power constraint,2 that is SKA = {KA|KA  0, tr(KA) ≤ P},
where P is the total power budget, and tr(KA) denotes the trace of
matrix KA.
2.1. Reformulation as a Convex Optimization Problem
The optimization problem in (4) presents two main difficulties: 1)
The cost function is not (simultaneously) concave on KA and RAE ;
and 2) the infinite constraints introduced by the robustness require-
ment can not be directly handled. Fortunately, the following theorem
ensures that (4) can be reformulated as a convex optimization prob-
lem
Theorem 1 The problem in (4) is equivalent to the convex optimiza-
tion problem (with SAE = R−1AE)
maximize
KA,SAE ,MA
GA,sA
log |INA + MARAB |
subject to
[
SAE + KA KA
KA KA −MA
]
 0,[
GA −ĤAESAE
−SAEĤHAE sAWA − SAE
]
 0,
GA = (1− sA)INE − ĤAESAEĤ
H
AE ,
sA ≥ 0, KA  0, tr(KA) ≤ P.
(5)
The proof is omitted due to the lack of space. However, its main
ingredients consist in the application of the matrix inversion lemma
(Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury formula) [20], the monotonicity of
the objective function with respect to RAE , and the S-procedure
[21].
2.2. Time Sharing Solutions
Until now, and analogously to [18], we have focused on a scenario
in which only Alice transmits over the air. However, as illustrated in
Fig. 4, we should consider a more general setting in which a frac-
tion (α) of the time is allocated for Alice’s transmissions, while Bob
transmits in the remaining fraction (1 − α) of time. The only sce-
nario in which the optimal solution consists in allocating all the time
to the same node (Alice or Bob) is given in the following lemma,
whose proof reduces to realize that in the single antenna case with
reciprocal channels, the secret key capacities are monotonically de-
creasing functions of the energy of the channel to the eavesdropper.
2Our general results can be easily extended to other practical cases such
as per antenna or peak power constraints.
Algorithm 1 Time Sharing for Robust SKC (Golden Section)
Input: RAB , RBA, RAE , RBE , WA, WB and precision γ.
Output: Optimal covariance matrices KA and KB , and time
sharing factor α.
Initialize: φ = 1 + 1−
√
5
2
, and M = log γ
log(1−φ) .
Evaluate (by solving (7)) R(α) at αmin = 0, α1 = φ, α2 =
1− φ, and αmax = 1.
for t = 1, . . . ,M do
if the maximum evaluated R(α) is at α2 or αmax then
Set the new lower bound αmin = α1, and update α1 = α2.
New evaluation point α2 = αmin +(1−φ)(αmax−αmin).
else
Set the new upper bound αmin = α2, and update α2 = α1.
New evaluation point α1 = αmin + φ(αmax − αmin).
end if
EvaluateR(α) at the new evaluation point, and obtain KA and
KB by solving (7).
end for
Lemma 1 In the case of single antenna nodes (NA = NB = NE =
1), reciprocal channels, and a total power constraint, the optimal
solution consists in allocating all the time to the same node.
In the general case, we must solve the following optimization
problem
maximize
α
R(α)
subject to 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
(6)
where the overall secret key rate R(α) is the optimal value of the
following convex optimization problem
maximize αRAB + (1− α)RBA
subject to RAB ≤ log |INA + MARAB | ,
RBA ≤ log |INB + MBRBA| ,[
SCE + KC KC
KC KC −MC
]
 0, C = A,B,[
GC −ĤCESCE
−SCEĤHCE sCWC − SCE
]
 0, C = A,B,
GC = (1− sC)INE − ĤCESCEĤ
H
CE , C = A,B,
KC  0, sC ≥ 0, C = A,B,
αtr(KA) + (1− α)tr(KB) ≤ P,
(7)
where the optimization variables are RAB , KA, SAE , MA, GA,
sA, RBA, KB , SBE , MB , GB , sB , and where RAB and RBA
represent, respectively, the secret key rates from Alice to Bob, and
from Bob to Alice.
The following lemma, whose proof is based on standard convex-
ity arguments, establishes a key property of the function R(α).
Lemma 2 The function R(α) is concave in 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and its
maximum can be efficiently found by means of the golden section
algorithm.
Finally, the application of the golden section algorithm [22] provides
the overall procedure summarized in Algorithm 1.
3. IMPORTANT PARTICULAR CASES
In this section we focus on two particularly important cases, which
consider scenarios with very limited (if any) knowledge about the
eavesdropper channel. We analyze the case with Alice’s transmis-
sions, but the extension to the time-sharing case is trivial. Addition-
ally, here we focus on the case with a spherical uncertainty region of
radius ε, i.e. WA = ε−2INA .
3.1. Centered Eavesdropper Channel
Let us start by considering the case with ĤAE = 0, which is rea-
sonable when the channel (or even the presence) of the eavesdrop-
per can not be estimated, but we can ensure that it is bounded as
‖HAE‖ ≤ ε. In this case, it is easy to prove that the worst case ma-
trix RAE = HHAEHAE is RAE = ε
2INA , and therefore, a straight-
forward analysis of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [23]
provides the following result.
Lemma 3 When the only knowledge about the eavesdropper chan-
nel is given by the uncertainty region ‖HAE‖ ≤ ε, the optimal
transmit covariance matrix is given by KA = UΛUH , where U
are the eigenmodes of the channel HAB , i.e., it is obtained from
the eigenvalue decomposition RAB = HHABHAB = UΣUH , and
the transmission powers in Λ = diag(λ1, . . . , λNA) are given by a
waterfilling like algorithm
λk =
[
σk
µ
− 1
σk + ε2
]
+
, (8)
where Σ = diag(σ1, . . . , σNA), [·]+ = max(·, 0), and the water-
level µ is chosen to satisfy tr(KA) = P .
3.2. Large Uncertainty Sets
For very large uncertainty sets (ε  max(‖ĤAE‖, ‖ĤAB‖)), we
can particularize the results of the previous subsection, which yields
the following result.
Lemma 4 For ε  max(‖ĤAE‖, ‖ĤAB‖), the optimal transmit
covariance matrix is given by the following matched-filtering like
solution
KA =
P
tr(RAB)
RAB . (9)
The proof of the previous lemma is simply based on the anal-
ysis of (8) for very large ε. Interestingly, the obtained result signi-
ficatively differs from the case with perfect CSI and very low SNR,
which was analyzed in [18], proving that the optimal solution re-
duces to “ignore” the eavesdropper channel and beamforming on the
principal mode of the channel HAB . Instead of that, our result indi-
cates that for large uncertainty sets, all the modes of the legitimate
channel must be excited.
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Our main findings are illustrated in this section by means of some
numerical results. In all the cases, the channels HAB and HAE have
been randomly generated from a standard Rayleigh distribution, and
we have considered spherical uncertainty sets with radius ε. In the
first example, we show the results obtained by solving the convex op-
timization problem in (5). In particular, we consider NA = 4 anten-
nas, and show the averaged results of 300 independent experiments.
Figs. 2 and 3 show the results for the cases with NB = NE = 2
and NB = NE = 4, where we can see that the uncertainty in the
eavesdropper channel reduces the degrees of freedom (slope of the
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Fig. 2. Performance analysis of the robust solution obtained from
(5). NA = 4, NB = NE = 2.
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Fig. 3. Performance analysis of the robust solution obtained from
(5). NA = NB = NE = 4.
secret key rate for high SNR) to zero. In other words, the satura-
tion effect in the secret key rates indicates that there exists a point in
which increasing the transmission power is useless, and instead of
that, Alice and Bob should focus on improving their estimates of the
eavesdropper channel. In any case, we can see that positive practical
secret key rates can be achieved even without perfect CSI.
In the second example, we consider a toy problem with NA =
NB = NE = 2, ε = 0.1, HAB = HBA = diag(10, 1), HAE =
5I2 and HBE = diag(10, 0). Fig. 4 shows the rates obtained when
only one node (Alice or Bob) transmits, and also certificates the op-
timality of the time sharing solutions provided by Algorithm 1.
Finally, we consider the case with very limited CSI (ĤAE = 0)
for different uncertainty radius ε. Fig. 5 shows the averaged results
of 300 independent simulations with NA = 4 and NB = NE = 2,
for the waterfilling (Lemma 3) and matched-filtering (Lemma 4) al-
gorithms. As expected, for sufficiently large radius, both techniques
provide identical results.
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Fig. 4. Optimality of the time-sharing solutions. NA = NB =
NE = 2, ε = 0.1.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of the waterfilling and matched-filtering algo-
rithms. ĤAE = 0, NA = 4, NB = NE = 2.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a robust approach to the design of covariance
matrices for maximizing the secret key capacity (SKC) in a Gaus-
sian MIMO induced source model. In the cases of unavailable or
highly inaccurate estimates of the eavesdropper channel, the optimal
transmit covariance matrix can be obtained by means of waterfilling
like or matched filtering like algorithms. Moreover, we have illus-
trated the benefits of allowing time sharing between transmissions
of the two legitimate nodes, providing an efficient algorithm for this
general scenario.
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